One of the most significant features of the Indian Department in its early days was the strong personal hold which the officers of the Department acquired over the Indians. For many years, the men who ran the Department were men who had been schooled in the tradition of Sir William Johnson; when they passed on, their sons succeeded to their appointments and to their influence. Many of the officers of the Department were related to one another, and in some instances, to the very Indians whose affairs they administered. Names like Johnson, McKee, Claus, Elliott, Caldwell, Chew and others were names familiar to more than one generation of Indians; and they were still names to conjure with in 1812. This fact gave the Indian Department a strong sense of independence, one which brought it into conflict with the military authorities after the war broke out.
the Indians were encouraged by Great Britain never to let the ancient covenant chain of friendship grow brown with rust. Political and military factors made it essential for the British to retain the confidence of the Indians. Against the western Indians the colony of Upper Canada had no defence whatever; against the Americans, unfriendly and threatening, Canada's greatest assurance of protection seemed to lie in the support of the red men. The fur trade too, still one of the principal economic activities of Canada, required the friendship of the western Indians. That is why the Indians continued to receive presents in large numbers from the British government through the agency of the British Indian Department. Undoubtedly these presents, the ofiScial expressions of sympathy, the retention of the western posts until 1796, the presence of British agents at Indian councils, must have worked strongly upon the minds of the Indians to convince them that Great Britain was still their ally and that in a final test of strength with the United States, Great Britain would defend them; even when no ofiScial encouragement was actually given them so to believe.
The British might hope for much from the western tribes; from the Six Nations they could expect less. The League of the Iroquois for the greater part, and the Mohawk in particular, had thrown in their lot with the British between 1776 and 1783. They had been assured that their interests would never be forgotten by their Great Father the Iiing when peace should be made and felt confident that the boundaries fixed at Stanwix in 1768 would be confirmed by victory in arms. When the treaty was finally signed in 1783 it included no mention of.the claims of the Indians. There was bitter disillusion among the tribes. They had never accepted the view that they were subjects of the Crown: they were Allies. The King had no right to cede to the United States lands which were not his to cede.
• Sir John Johnson, unwilling though he was for obvious reasons to undertake the task, was finally compelled to go to Niagara to face the Indians assembled in Council. Even liberal portions of rum and Johnson's evasions of the truth could not calm the fears of the Six Nations that they had been cheated by the British; • nor did Haldimand's grant of lands to John Nevertheless the Six Nations were prepared to fight when war came to their doors and when they became convinced that the British were determined to prosecute the war with real vigour. They had little enough for which to thank the British; from the Americans they could expect even less. From the Caughnawaga Indians, the "praying Indians" of the Ancien R•gime, the British might hope for, but had little reason to expect, much assistance in the event of war. There had been a strong infiltration of New England blood into the Indians at the Sault St-Louis, as Peter Kalm observed in 1740, 5 and their attitude during the American Revolutionary War had not been one to inspire great confidence in their loyalty to Great Britain. In 1778 the Indian superintendent accused them of having "listened to the singing of evil birds" and declared that the hatchet which he had given them had "been rusted by some Dirt which the Rebels wanted to throw in your Eyes. "ø Iroquois from Caughnawaga formed part of a delegation to the French headquarters at New-*The two questions at issue were the boundaries of the Grand River reserve and the right of the Indians to a transmissible title. This last was withheld by Simcoe for the protection of the Indians, much to their annoyance. The Six Nations finally gave Joseph Brant power of attorney to surrender, sell, or transfer their lands for the purpose of forming a fund which would provide them with an annuity when the wild game had vanished. Brant conveyed large tracts of lands by sale and by 999 year lease, in many instances for nominal consideration. •Prisoners taken during the Ancien Rdgime hagl frequently been adopted by and later married into the Indian tribes. •qDwing to the capture of Hull s orders and despatches at Brownstown as a result of an Indian ambush, the British were fully informed of Hull's weakness and his fear of the Indians. It was thus possible to play upon his fears by planting a letter purporting to be from Procter to the commanding officer at Michilimackinac asking that no more Indians be sent to Amherstburg as there were already more than 5,000 there! (Beirne, The War of 181•, 103).
• The Indians, however useful their services may have been at Michilimackinac, Brownstown, and Detroit, were at best unsatisfactory soldiers. They were devoid of discipline. They lacked tenacity and were easily discouraged by failure. They were restless, dissatisfied during periods of enforced inactivity, and yet inclined to fight for only brief periods at a time. Tactically they offered great advantages in ambuscades and forest warfare, but when it came to besieging a fort protected by walls and cannon, they were invariably useless?
This weakness on the part of the Indians as a fighting force became painfully apparent during the campaign of 1813. In January Colonel Procter administered a check to General Winchester at Au Raisin River where the issue was decided by the Indians outflanking the Americans on either side and gaining their rear; at Fort Meigs, however, the Indians drifted away after several days' siege leaving Procter, according to his own report, with "less than twenty Chiefs and Warriors." Well might Procter add that "under present Circumstances, at least, our Indian Force is not a disposable one, or permanent, tho' occasionally a most powerful Aid. "3ø Throughout the spring and summer western Indians flocked to Amherstburg adding both to Procter's strength and to his embarrassment. They consumed vast quantities of food and Procter's supplies were never abundant. It was, therefore, as Meanwhile, the Americans were using every effort to scrape up a few native warriors for themselves. The failure of Cornplanter's mission to the Grand River in 1812 had not, perhaps, been wholly unexpected; but the chilly reply of the Seneca to the American request that they take up the hatchet 5ø and the letter sent by a number of Oneida, Onondaga, Stockbridge, and Tuscarora Indians to the president of the United States on September 28 expressing their desire to remain neutral and their regret that they should ever have been asked to take up arms in a white man's war, 5• must have been a great disappointment.
Early in 1813 a determined drive was made to enlist Indian support. The United States Indian Department might point out that the president had never authorized the employment of the Indians, but the army needed them and General Dearborn, the commander-in-chief at Niagara, made it clear that he wanted 150 "young warriors of the Six Nations" to meet him at Fort George. •Documentary History, VII, 159, Hampton to secretary for war, Sept. 22, 1818.
IV. Tx•E CAMPAIGN OF 1814
The decisive year was 1814. With the entrance of the Allies into Paris and the fall of the French Empire it was obvious that if the Americans were to achieve victory in Canada they would have to do so before the arrival of the reinforcements from Wellington's armies which events in Europe would now set free.
The The problem of handling the Indians during the war was not simply a matter of preventing them from indulging in the barbaric practices usually associated with Indian warfare, it was also a matter of preserving good relations between the army and the Indian Department. And these, unfortunately, were never very satisfactory during 1812-14. Even prior to the outbreak of hostilities Captain Norton, an Indianized Scotsman 6ø who sought to step into the shoes of Joseph Brant as the principal leader of the Six Nations, had come into conflict with the officers of the Indian Department, and in particular with William Claus, the deputy superintendent-general. Brock was not unaware of this personal antagonism and the effect which it had upon the tribes on the Grand River. As early as May, 1812 he had noted that while the Six Nations seemed "well disposed" they were, unfortunately, divided "on points which some white people find an interest in keeping alive.' '6• The issue raised by the quarrel between Norton and Claus was a fundamental one. Norton had proved himself to be a good fighting man, and for that reason he received the support of officers like Prevost, de Rottenburg, Harvey, and others, who felt that the first consideration should be that of winning the war. The political implications of Norton's activities were of no concern to them. On the other hand the Indian Department and the civil authorities had to look to the future. They were obliged to consider what problems might arise were Norton to achieve his object of becoming the leader of the Six Nations; better by far that the Indians should remain peaceful and submissive than stirred up to make embarrassing demands. For that reason Claus not only attempted to play down Norton's ability as a leader of the fighting Indians, One of the great blunders committed by the British delegates to Versailles in 1783 had been failure to secure some guarantees for the Indian allies of the Crown, in the final treaty of peace. The problem of obtaining Indian assistance during the War of 1812 had kept this lesson before the minds of the British authorities and when their representatives left London for Ghent in 181zi they were bound by instructions to make some effort to arrive at an understanding with the United States over the Indian boundary line. It was to the credit of the British that they would not consent to any arrangement which excluded the Indians, and righteously asserted of Great Britain that "it is utterly inconsistent with her practice and her principles ever to abandon in her negotiations for peace those who have co-operated with her in war"6•---an assertion which would have stuck in any Indian throat at that date.
The original British proposal called for the establishment of a clearly-defined Indian territory in which the Indians might live their own independent existence, the boundaries to follow those fixed at Greenville in 1795. This was, at least in principle, what the Indians had been fighting for. But the defeat at Moraviantown and the loss of that territory beyond Lake Erie which the capture of Detroit by Brock and Tecumseh had given them, made 
